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This  paper  examines  the  strategic  interactions  among  the  central  and  a  subcentral 
government where incomplete information forces both to form expectations about the other’s 
behaviour, especially the probability that the central government will bail out the local one. 
Various  determinants  and  outcomes  of  the  strategic  interaction  are  explored.  The  model 
generates  empirical  restrictions  about  the  central  government’s  transfer  decisions  and  the 
lower  government’s  spending  behaviour.  These  restrictions  are  tested  on  a  sample  of  20 
Italian  Regions.  Data  show  that  bailing  out  expectations  are  a  quantitatively  important 
component of local government spending. 
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1.  Introduction and literature review 
When and why  can a  subcentral  government  rationally  expect  to  be bailed out  by the 
central government? How do these expectations affect its spending behaviour? And when and 
why, instead, the strategic interactions between two government levels produce equilibrium in 
the  public  finances  of  the  subcentral  government?  At  which  budget  size?  These  are  the 
questions addressed in this paper, both on theoretical and empirical grounds.  
The literature has so far concentrated on the first two issues. The standard response is that 
subcentral  governments  rationally  form  bailing  out  expectations  whenever  soft  budget 
constraints characterize their relationship with the central government  (Kornai et al. 2003). 
This enables them to engage in excessive spending ex ante. Research then focused on the 
causes of soft budget constraints to understand the formation of bailing out expectations and 
excessive spending: political expediencies, negative externalities associated with the failure of 
the organization in crisis, reputational incentives for the supporting organization, its need to 
recoup past investments, paternalism, corruption (Kornai et al., 2003; Maskin, 1999; Quian 
and Roland, 1998; Rodden and Eskeland, 2003). All these motives, however, presuppose an 
inability of rescuers to commit to no bail out ex ante (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995).  This 
framework of analysis has lead to the development of models of soft budget constraints and 
bailing out from the point of view of the supporting agency (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; 
Qian and Roland, 1998; Maskin, 1999; Kornai et al. 2003; Goodspeed, 2002). Because these 
models are to explain the motives of a bailing out outcome, they concentrate on the behaviour 
of the organization that actually bails out, the central government in our case.  
There are, however, two closely related issues that this class of models finds difficult to 
address. First, these models treat bailing out as a dichotomous choice: either the supporting 
organization bails out or refuses. Yet, especially in intergovernmental relations, bailing out is 
only one of the possible outcomes of the strategic relationship between the central and the 
subcentral governments. The central government may refuse to bail out, or do so with delay, 
and/or be selective of which local government to relieve from trouble and which to abandon to 
self  financing  through  a  fiscal  crunch.  Moreover,  there  might  also  be  forms  of  “implicit 
bailing  out”,  where  the  central  government’s  inability  to  commit  is  so  severe  that  it 
immediately surrenders to the profligacy of the local government and sets a high level of 
transfers ex ante
2 A more complete illustration of the various outcomes of the relationship 
allows answering also to the third and fourth question posed at the beginning, namely, under 
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which  conditions  such  relationship  produces  an  equilibrium  in  the  public  finances  of  a 
subcentral government and at which expenditure level. Secondly, this larger variety of courses 
of action for the central government increases uncertainty for the local government and makes 
it harder to form expectations. The larger set of strategies that the central government may 
adopt expands also the set of the possible responses by the subcentral government, which in 
turn triggers a larger variety of possible further reactions by the central government.  
This greater complexity requires going beyond the modelling structure concentrated on the 
central government to select a multi-centred one instead, where the decision-making processes 
of both actors are equally important matters of inquiry.  The recent literature witnesses an 
increasing number of papers that adopt such a modelling strategy. Inman (2003) proposes a 
multi-centred model of the institutional framework where the relationships between the U.S. 
States and the Federal government take place. Rodden adopts a multi-centred perspective in 
his studies of the fiscal interactions within the EU (Rodden, 2006) and between the German 
Federal government and the Länder (Rodden, 2005). Bordignon and Turati (2009) formalize 
the analysis  of the role played by  uncertainty  in  fiscal  relationships  within  a  multi-tiered 
government structure and apply it to the case of health care financing and spending. The 
theoretical  structure  that  moulds  all  these  models  is  Harsanyi’s  (1967-68)  games  with 
incomplete information.  
Within this literature, the closest work to the present one is Bordignon and Turati (2009), 
as it also features a variant of Harsanyi’s model and it analyses Italian regional data as well. 
With respect to that work, however, we introduce several innovations. On the theoretical side, 
we relax some assumptions that were unnecessarily restrictive (and are in fact absent in the 
other papers, as well as in Harsanyi’s original formulation) to contemplate a greater variety of 
subcentral government types. The equilibrium results obtained in this paper are therefore at 
variance with those of Bordignon and Turati (2009) in many cases. On the empirical side, we 
disentangle the empirical analysis from the “natural experiment” of the health care reforms 
stimulated by Italy’s participation to the monetary union in the 1990s,  and focus on total 
regional  expenditures  and  transfers.  Looking  at  the  whole  budget  and  not  only  at  one 
component, albeit as significant as health care
3, is an important innovation because regional 
governments can adopt practices of creative accounting  to  transfer funds from spending 
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programs where the budget constraint is more binding to others where it is less (e.g., from 
current to capital spending or from health care to other, less visible programs). They can also 
toggle between resources coming from central government’s transfers and from own taxes. 
Because of that, only the analyses that consider the budget process as a whole can adequately 
represent  the  “softness”  of  the  budget  constraints  of  the  subcentral  governments  and  the 
bailing out expectations that they hence formulate. We also extend the sample to more years 
and  regions  to  those  featured  in  Bordignon  and  Turati  (2009),  including  also  the  special 
statute  ones.  This  more  comprehensive  empirical  approach  allows  us  to  provide  a  more 
general test of the theory and a more accurate assessment of the extent to which bailing out 
expectations inflate regional spending.  
An important feature of the theory is that it leads to a variety of financial outcomes – 
immediate bailing outs, deferred bailing outs, ex ante and deferred fiscal responsibility by the 
local government, as well as “failure” of the local government
4 – with respect to which the 
subcentral  government  has  to  generate rational expectations.  Interestingly, the model also 
shows that in certain cases soft budget constraints exist even if no formal bail out operations 
are put in place, for example when the central government avoids a deferred bail out by 
“giving  in”  immediately.  Notwithstanding  this  variety  of  theoretical  equilibria,  it  can  be 
shown that, once the central and local governments know the structure of the game they are in 
fact playing, they formulate rational expectations about the other agent’s best reply functions 
and, by that, about the probability of a bailout. This empirical restriction is then tested on data 
about the relationships between the Italian central and regional governments for the 1995-
2007  time  interval.  The  estimates  show  that  these  expectations  play  an  important  role  in 
determining  the  spending  behaviour  and  the  financial  performance  of  the  subcentral 
governments, regardless of the formal institutional constraints that are in place.  
The key issue of the empirical analysis is the representation of the bailing out expectations, 
as  they  are  in  principle  unobservable.  The  empirical  literature  offers  a  set  of  alternative 
techniques for the purpose; they are all adopted here to verify the robustness of the estimated 
results. In particular, expectations are specified both through an autoregressive forecasting 
procedure, as in Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1993), Rattsø (1999) and Rodden (2005), as well as 
through the IV strategy proposed by Pettersson-Lidblom and Dahlberg (2003) and Pettersson-
Lidblom (2008).  
                                                 
4 Insolvent local governments generally do not go bankrupt like private corporations. Their “failure” is to be 
intended as the central government’s refusal to bail them out, which forces the local government to implement a 
tight fiscal policy and/or to face political consequences, depending on the institutional features of the country.    5 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 illustrates the equilibria generated by 
the  theoretical  model  under  different  information  and  payoff  structures  and  discusses  the 
testable empirical restrictions that the model generates. The empirical strategy is described in 
part 3, and the econometric results are discussed in part 4. Part 5 draws the main conclusions 
of  the  analysis.  Appendix  A  presents  the  theoretical  model  in  full,  appendix  B  provides 
information about the main features of the Italian system of intergovernmental relations, while 
appendix C describes the data sources. 
 
2. A synthesis of the theoretical model 
2.1. Game theoretic structures. There are two alternative ways to represent the strategic 
interactions between a central and a subcentral government. In the first case, no government 
level  enjoys  an informational  advantage over  the other, so  there is  no uncertainty  in  this 
setting (Inman, 2003; Rodden, 2006). This game theoretic structure well describes real world 
situations where the relationship between the central and the subcentral government is tightly 
regulated, e.g., by a formula and/or a set of institutions that provide the central government 
with  a  credible  commitment  technology.  The  lack  of  uncertainty  and  of  possibilities  of 
discretionary  behaviour  make  it  impossible  to  represent  bailing  out  expectations  in  this 
theoretical context: still this structure is a useful first step to the more complex setting where 
information is asymmetric and bailing out expectations  are made.  
In the second case, uncertainty is introduced to examine how the central and the subcentral 
governments  form  expectations about  each other’s  behaviour. The hypothesis  of common 
knowledge  must  be  replaced  by  the  assumption  that  there  are  two  “types”  of  central 
government, a “weak” one that bails out and a “tough” one that does not. The information 
about  the  type  of  central  government  is  private  and  exogenous.  Everything  else  remains 
common knowledge. Such uncertainty expands the set of possible decisions of the central 
government, and forces the regional ones to form expectations about the central government 
type in order to select their optimal response functions. This is the basic setting of Harsanyi 
(1967-68) models of incomplete information.  
2. 2. Strategic interactions with complete information. Consider a simple economy with 
two governments, a central and a regional one. The central government moves first and sets 
the level of resources to be given to the regional government for the next period, r, which can 
be either high (R) or low (r), so that vector r={r,R}, where R>r>0. These revenues can be 
thought of as transfers or revenue sharing schemes; for simplicity, the region is supposed to 
have no fiscal autonomy. Upon observing r, the regional government selects an expenditure   6 
level from vector e. Again for simplicity it is supposed that also the regional government can 
only choose between two levels of expenditure, low or high, e={e, E}, where E>e>0. With no 
loss of generality, the funding and expenditure levels are assumed to be symmetric and equal, 
so that when both government levels play “high” or “low”, the regional government budget is 
in  balanced.  Furthermore,  if  the  central  government  is  “generous”,  i.e.,  it  sets  R  at  the 
beginning of the  game  (upper branch at M1 in figure 1), it is  assumed that the  regional 
government can only decide an expenditure level equal to E, as the budget rules forbid the 
rollover of unused funds
5. In this case (squared ending nod of the upper branch) the payoff for 
the central and the regional government are, respectively, U
C(R, E) and U
L(R, E). If, instead, 
the central government is “stingy”, it will set r at the first stage of the game (lower branch at 
M1) and the regional government may choose between a) setting e (lower branch at M2), a 
move that ends the game with payoffs for the two agents of U
C(r,e) and U
L(r,e), respectively; 
and b) selecting E thus running a deficit (upper branch at M2). If so, it is again the central 
government’s turn to choose among two alternative courses of action: a) it may be “tough” 
and impose a hard budget constraint on the regional government (lower branch at M3); b) it 
may be “weak” and create a soft budget constraint (upper branch at M3). By imposing a hard 
budget constraint, the central government refuses to accommodate the increased expenditure 
by  the  regional  government,  forcing  it to  take care of the deficit through increased local 
taxation; in this case the utility levels of the two agents are respectively U
C(r, E) and U
L(r, E).  
If, alternatively, the central government places a soft budget constraint on the regional one, at 
M3 it will accommodate the increased local spending by increasing transfers, with the utility 
levels of the two agents being U
Cb(R,E) and U
Lb(R,E), where the superscript b stands for 
“bailing out”.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
To characterize the equilibria, the following assumptions on payoffs for each government 



















                                                 
5 In the light of the literature on the flypaper effect, the case where the local government actually runs a 
surplus or lowers other revenues (excluded from the model), seems factually irrelevant and adds nothing to the 
present analysis.    7 
Assumptions A1) and A2) say that the central government essentially prefers low financing 
and low expenditure to high financing and high expenditure, both when the bailing out occurs 
and  when  it  does  not.  Assumption  A3)  asserts  that  the  regional  government  prefers  high 
expenditure and high financing (and the earlier the better), but that if it had to finance itself 
the  deficit  in  the  case  of  low  financing,  it  would  prefer  to  cut  expenditure  immediately. 
Assumption  A4)  guarantees  that  it  is  indeed  Pareto  efficient  to  constrain  financing  and 
expenditure at the low level. In light of the positive literature on the politics of transfers from 
central to local governments (Padovano, 2011 provides a survey) all these assumptions seem 
plausible. In particular, A1) and A2) mimic institutions that impose a hard budget constraint 
and  spending  limits  on  the  central  government,  such  as  strict  budgetary  rules  and/or 
international financial treaties such as the Growth and Stability Pact. A3) instead represent the 
quite general case where local governments have the option to finance local expenditure via 
revenue sharing schemes or any form of common pool situation. The setup of the model is 
therefore quite general.  
The payoffs of the central government determine the equilibria of this game. In particular, 
it can be easily shown that, in this case of perfect information, the only subgame perfect 
equilibria of this game are: 
E1) If U
C(r,E)>U
Cb(R,E), i.e., the central government is stingy and places a hard budget 





C(r,E), i.e., the central government is generous, it plays R at 




C(r ,E), i.e., the central government is possibly stingy but can 
place only a soft budget constraint on the regional one, then it plays r at M1, the regional 
government knows the payoff structure of the central government and reacts by selecting E at 
M2. The central government ends by bailing out the deficit of the regional government at M3. 
Assumption A4) ensures that the first best equilibrium is E1, when the central government 
can  credibly  commit  not  to  bail  out  regional  deficits.  If  it  cannot,  it  gives  in  either 
immediately, setting a high financing level (equilibrium E2), or later, deciding for a low level 
of financing in the first period and then bailing out the regional deficits later (equilibrium E3). 
Although second bests, E2 and E3 are both interesting cases. E2 shows that, contrary to what 
the literature generally maintains, soft budget constraints problems may appear in the form of 
excessive  funding  and  expenditure,  with  no  formal  bailing  out.  In  that  case,  the  central 
government knows ex ante that it cannot be tough on regional government spending, and   8 
gives  in  immediately.  E3  instead  shows  that  the  central  government  may  actually  find  it 
convenient to initially underfund the regional government and still end up with a bailing out. 
Delaying an inevitable bailout helps the central government in discriminating between the 
regional governments to save, e.g., between aligned and unaligned (Arulampalam et al. 2009) 
or between more and less politically rewarding ones (e.g., the “swing” regional governments, 
as in Dixit and Londregan, 1998). Else, the central government may simply wait for the least 
costly  period  to  bail  out  the  regional  governments  in  trouble.  The  empirical  literature 
(Padovano, 2011; Rodden, 2005; Bordignon and Turati, 2009) shows that both scenarios are 
factually relevant.  
2.2.  Strategic  interactions  with  incomplete  information.  To  examine  how  central  and 
regional governments form expectations about each other’s behaviour, uncertainty about the 
central government type must also be introduced in the strategic relationship just described; 
the  payoff  functions  of  the  regional  government  and  the  timing  of  the  game  remain 
unchanged.  
“Nature”  now  moves  first  at  M0  on  the  move  line  by  selecting  the  type  of  central 
government, “weak” or “tough”. The regional government must create some a priori on the 
“type” of central government it is facing. Suppose that the regional government now expects 
the central government to be “tough” with some exogenous probability π (Figure 2-4, upper 
branch at M0) and to be “weak” with probability 1- π (Figure 2-4, lower branch at M0).  
FIGURES 2-4 ABOUT HERE 
A “tough” central government, denoted by the superscript T,  prefers not to bail out the 
regional government in the event of a deficit: U
CT(r,E)>U
CbT(R,E). Instead, a “weak” central 
government, denoted as W, always prefers to bail out the regional government in the case of a 
deficit: U
CbW(R,E)>U
CW(r,E). Both types of government still prefer low expenditure and low 
financing to high expenditure and high financing.  
Figure 2 illustrates the outcomes common to all payoff structures, solved by backward 
induction.  The  upper  branches  at  M1  and  M2  describe  the  situation  where  the  central 
government sets R, then the regional government can only set E by assumption and the game 
ends  (Figure  2).  If  the  central  government  sets  r  in  the  first  period,  and  the  regional 
government reacts by setting e, the game is also over (lower branches at M1 and M2). The 
new interactions that uncertainty generates involve the case where the central government sets 
r at M1, and the region reacts by setting E (upper branches departing the second and fourth 
nod from the top at M2). In the final period, given our assumptions about the payoffs of both 
governments, the best strategy for the tough government is to play “not bailing out”, while the   9 
weak government plays “bailing out”. The final outcome will then be (r,E) in the first case 
and (R,E) in the second, with the associated payoffs of agents (squared nods at M3). Moving 
backward to the first period, the optimal strategies of the two types of central government are 
easily  characterized.  Consider  first  the  tough  type.  For  this  type,  setting  R  at  M1  is  a 
dominated  strategy  (dotted  line);  whatever  the  beliefs  of  the  regional  government,  if  the 
central government sets R, the regional government can only respond with E and for the tough 





CbT(R, E). Hence, the tough type certainly plays r in the first 
period. Consider now the weak type. There are two alternatives: A) the case where the central 
government prefers bailing out later to giving in immediately (U
CbW(R,E)>U
CW(R,E) in Figure 
2);  and  B)  the  case  where  the  central  government  prefers  giving  in  immediately 
(U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E) in Figure 3-4). In case A) setting R at M1 is a dominated strategy for 
the  weak  type  too  (upper  branch  starting  from  the  lower  nod  at  M1);  for  if  the  central 
government sets R, the regional government can only respond with E, and whatever beliefs 
the regional government holds upon observing r, even in the worst possible case where the 
regional government reacts by setting up E (upper branch starting from bottom nod at M2), 
the  weak  government  is  better  off  by  bailing  out  later  than  giving  in  immediately: 
U
CbW(R,E)>U
CW(R, E). In other words, as r is the dominant strategy for both the tough and 
weak government, the regional government will learn nothing about the type of government 
by observing r in the first period; it will still assume that this move comes from a tough 
government with probability π. π can therefore be interpreted as the ex ante probability of the 
central  government  being  “tough”  or,  likewise,  the  ex  ante  credibility  of  the  central 
government’s threat not to bail out in the future the regional governments in deficit. The 
regional government will choose E if it expects the central government to be a tough one with 
a probability equal or above a threshold level, and e if its expectations are for a weak type. 
Appendix B provides the proof of this statement and defines the threshold probability level. 
Consider next the case B), represented in figure 3, where the weak central government 
prefers to give in immediately to bailing out later (U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E)). In this situation, 
under  complete  information,  the  central  government  would  simply  give  in  immediately, 
setting  up  a  high  level  of  financing.  Under  incomplete  information,  however,  the  weak 
government can try to take advantage of regional government’s uncertainty and pose as the 
“tough” type. If the central government manages to convince the regional government that it 
is “tough”, it might attain the first best equilibrium. The eventual success of this strategy 
again depends on the regional government’s expectations about the central government type.   10 
If the ex ante credibility of the central government’s threat not to bail out future local deficits 
is high enough, the optimal reaction of the regional government is to set e at M2; although the 
regional government expects this, the probability that the government be in fact tough is too 
large for the regional government to be willing to run the risk of selecting a high level of 
expenditure, as it would then face the risk of failure with a large deficit to self finance. Hence, 
uncertainty creates the possibility for a weak central government to mimic a tough one, be 
believed, thus avoiding a bailing out outcome and forcing the regional government to keep 
expenditures at a low level. 
In the case where the weak central government cannot credibly mimic a tough one, the 
regional government would expect the choice of a low level of transfers r to come from a 
weak government. It would then rationally react by setting a high level of spending, expecting 
to be bailed out, which in turn forces the central government to set a high level of transfers R 
immediately,  again  because  U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E).  This  is  another  case  of  “immediate 
surrender”.  
Finally,  the  less  factually  relevant,  but  theoretically  possible,  case  that  the  central 
government  randomizes  between  strategies  is  described  in  figure  4  and  demonstrated  in 
appendix B. 
2.3.  Empirical  restrictions.  The  incomplete  information  version  of  the  model  offers  a 
number of interesting empirical restrictions. Quite importantly, these predictions are common 
to all the different payoff structures, used to represent different institutional scenarios, as they 
all  revolve  around  the  key  theoretical  variable  π,  the  ex  ante  credibility  of  the  central 
government’s threat not to bail out future local deficits. Three are the main predictions:  
H1) Coeteris paribus, it should be more likely to observe a low level of ex ante financing 
when π is high. For instance, under perfect information in case E2 the central government 
immediately gives in and sets a high level of financing. Conversely, in the same case under 
incomplete information, the central government sets a low level of ex ante financing with at 
least some positive probability, and this probability is increasing in π. 
H2) Having observed a low level of ex ante financing, the regional government is more 
likely to react with a low level of expenditure when π is high. At high values of π, a low level 
of financing is a more reliable signal that the government is indeed “tough”; the regional 
government therefore reacts by choosing a low level of expenditures. For example, under 
perfect information in case E3 the government sets r at the beginning of the game, but the 
regional government does not believe the implied threat, and reacts by choosing a high level 
of  expenditure.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  same  case  under  incomplete  information,  upon   11 
observing r the regional government reacts by choosing a low level of expenditure if π is 
sufficiently high. 
H3) Another implication of the model can be found by further modifying the structure of 
the  game.  In  the  above  model,  if  the  regional  government  chooses  the  high  level  of 
expenditure E, the weak central government would always reveal itself by bailing out regional 
deficits. But this feature is simply the result of having analysed a single shot of the financing-
expenditure game. If the game is repeated several times, we would find equilibria where at 
least in the early stages, even the weak government would find it convenient not to bail out 
the regional government in the event of a deficit, in order to build a reputation of being 
“tough” for future periods (as in the reputation models à la Kreps and Wilson, 1982). This 
extension of the game is not worked out in appendix B. But there is an obvious prediction of 
the repeated version of the model that seems nonetheless worth exploring empirically; if the 
regional  government  has  observed  a  large  amount  of  bailing  out  in  the  past,  it  should 
rationally predict that the same government is weak with larger probability. That is, a history 
of bail outs reduces the central government’s ex ante credibility of its threats of no further 
bailouts (π in the model above). This also implies that one should observe higher level of ex 
ante financing and current expenditure. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
3.1. Data sources. The dataset draws from the strategic interactions between the Italian 
central government and the regions. It spans across 21 cross section units (19 Regions, plus 
the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano) in the time interval between 1996 and 
2007,  for  which  consistent  financial  data  about  transfers  are  available,  as  explained  in 
appendix C, which also describes the data sources of the dependent and independent variables. 
3.2.  Modelling  expectations.  In  order  to  link  the  theoretical  model  with  observable 
variables, we consider two sets of proxies for the variable π, i.e., the regional governments’ 
assessment of the “toughness” of the central government. The first set includes time varying 
proxies (vector TPROXY), the second region specific ones (vector RPROXY). Bordignon 
and Turati (2009) follow a similar strategy in their examination of health care expenditures of 
Italian regions, but consider a quite limited set of determinants and proxies for expectations. 
Their approximation of bailing out expectations is possibly misspecified, as Padovano (2011) 
shows  that  a  much  larger  set  of  factors  in  fact  affects  the  central  government’s  transfer 
decisions  and  the  regional  government  spending  levels.  If  that  is  actually  the  case,  the 
importance of bailing out expectations in their analysis is overestimated. The present analysis   12 
fully exploits the relevant literature to provide a characterization of expectations as careful 
and detailed as possible.  
Being time-varying only, the elements of the vector TPROXY affect all regions in the 
same way. Proxies of this kind are indexes of the tightness of the central government budget, 
such as the ratio between the consolidated deficit of the Italian central government and the 
average EU15 deficit (DDPIL)
6. Another candidate is the presence of national elections, ELN, 
which takes the value of 1 in year t if national elections are held in the second half of that 
year, or 1 in year t and t-1 if elections fall in the first half of the year t, and 0 otherwise. This 
variable  captures  political  budget  cycle  effects  that  could  potentially  ease  the  budget 
constraint of all regions. To make sure that we are actually finding a cycle, i.e. that the budget 
first expands and then shrinks around an election, we have included also a one forward lag of 
ELN.  Outside  the  electoral  periods,  the  electoral  strength  of  the  national  government 
conditions its need to use transfers to acquire votes locally. We proxy the electoral strength by 
the vote margin between the government majority and the opposition, NDIF; it should be 
negatively related with the amount of transfers distributed. For equal margins of majority, the 
homogeneity  of  the  government  coalition  may  also  affect  transfers  decisions.  More 
fragmented governments are more likely to be weakened by internal wars of attrition that 
reduce their expected life and force them to distribute more transfers as a means to acquire 
votes in local constituencies (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Padovano and Venturi, 2001).We 
measure government fragmentation by the Herfindhal index of the parliamentary seats of the 
government majority, HM. Finally, we include also a linear trend (variable TREND) common 
to all regions that mimics the so-called “historical expenditure” rule, an incremental value 
mechanism à la Wildavsky (1964) by which Italian regions could expect to receive every year 
an incremental value of the previous year’s current transfers.  
The second set of proxies shows variability also across regions, and represents changes of 
expectations due to region specific events (vector RPROXY). Variables of this kind are the 
alignment effect  between the central  and the regional  government, which summarises  the 
comparatively lower political cost for the central government to bail out a “friendly” regional 
government – and the expectations that regional governments attach to such a fact. Another 
relevant factor is the vote margin of the regional government over the opposition; although 
this variable, RDIF, is constructed in the same way as the national counterpart, the underlying 
                                                 
6 We have also explored the impact of the loosening of the Growth and Stability Pact in 2005 by means of a 
dummy centred on that year (EASE95), but it never showed a significant explanatory power due to its proximity 
to the end of the sample.   13 
relationship with the distribution of grants is more difficult to interpret. On the one hand, 
probabilistic  voting  models  à  la  Dixit  and  Londregan  (1996)  predict  that  the  central 
government directs grants to marginal or “swing” regions, which should result in an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between regional vote differences and transfers. Alternatively, as Cox 
and  McCubbins  (1987)  first  suggested,  risk  adverse  politicians  in  the  central  government 
might use grants to reward local politicians for electoral success and consolidate their local 
constituencies. In this case we should observe  a positive linear coefficient on  RDIF. The 
statistical significance of the coefficient on the square of the RDIF variable discriminates 
among these two competing theories. The distribution of grants by the central government 
may  also  be modelled  as  a  rent  seeking  game,  with the various  regions  characterized by 
different  lobbying  skills.  Efficient  lobbying  requires  that  regional  politicians  (often  the 
governors themselves) establish connections with the central government politicians and top 
bureaucrats, chiefly in the Ministry of Economics and Finance, build personal prestige and 
political weight. As these endeavours require time, it is plausible that regional governments 
that are in charge since longer time (variable GOVYEARS) are likely to be more effective at 
lobbying and will thus obtain more transfers (Padovano, 2011). Finally, Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2008) and Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg (2003) refer to the dynamic structure implicit in 
any soft budget constraint problems and argue that the history of past bailing out should be the 
best predictor for expectations of future bailing out. We account for this argument by means 
of a i×t matrix of dummy variables FBOUT that takes the value of 1 when region i in year t is 
the beneficiary of a special transfer of resources from the central government, reported in the 
financial bill (Legge Finanziaria).  
3.3. The empirical strategy. The first round of estimates basically verifies the hypothesis 
that the distribution of grants by the central government to the regions strictly follows strictly 
the formula enshrined in the law, with no room for discretionary behaviour by the central 
government and, consequently, no possibility of bailouts. To this end we include in the first 
specification  of  the  funding  equation  only  the  variables  that  the  formula  for  equalization 
transfers (Brosio et al. 2007), namely, variables that meter the state of the regional economy 
and the size of the population. This first round of estimates provides us with a benchmark to 
evaluate the explanatory power of the proxies for bailout expectations explicitly included in 
the theoretical  model;  furthermore, inasmuch  as  the part of funds that are not  distributed 
according to the formula fits into the category of exceptional (although frequent) intervention, 
it  can  be  interpreted  as  bailout  interventions.  The  second  test  is  related  to  the  empirical 
restriction H1, namely, that a low level of financing is more likely observed when π is high.   14 
To this end, we first check that all the time- and regional-varying proxies for bailing out 
expectations affect the financing decision of the central government. According to the model 
“weak” central government are also tempted to reduce financing in the first place, as they can 
anticipate the shift in expectations held by regional governments. To verify the generality of 
the  model  in  light  of  regional  governments’  possibility  to  toggle  funds  between  different 
spending programs, thus avoid binding constraints, we consider three different measures of 
financing: real total transfers per capita from the central to the regional government, TR/POP, 
and their disaggregation between transfers earmarked to current spending (TRC/POP) and 
capital  spending  (TRK/POP).  Thirdly,  we  then  test  restriction  H2,  namely  that,  having 
observed a low level of financing, a regional government is more likely to react with a low 
level of expenditure when π is high. We thus verify how the proxies for bailout expectations, 
conditional on financing,  affect  regional expenditure  levels. The theoretical model in  fact 
implies that regional expenditure should be more tightly constrained by financing when the 
probability of having a tough central government is high, as the regional government should 
expect less bailing out in the future. To this end, we introduce our estimates for expected 
financing, the fitted values of the best performing model in terms of information criteria, into 
the expenditure regression and check that the estimated coefficients are consistent with the 
predictions  of  the  theoretical  model.  The  basic  idea  is  that  it  is  financing  conditional  on 
regional expectations about π that affects regional expenditure, rather than observed transfers.  
 
  4. Estimates 
4.1. Financing equations. The empirical analysis is based on Italian regional expenditure 
and funding over the years 1995–2007
7. We use a pooled EGLS with cross section we ights 
and robust standard errors in most of the estimates; we also consider an IV -2SLS panel 
estimate, again with robust standard errors, as a robustness check. .  
The first step is the definition of a model for ordinary (ex-ante) financing, which does not 
take into account the proxies for expectations listed above. There only the variables suggested 
in the welfare economics  literature, which  appear in formulas for equalizatio n transfers 
(Brosio et al., 2007), are considered. The first covariate is a general indicator of the state of 
the regional economy, i.e., the regional unemployment rate  U, lagged once due to the slow-
adjustment nature of the variable, which should be associated with higher per capita transfers 
                                                 
7 Since we have only a short time series (t = 13), testing for the presence of unit root and cointegration is 
impossible. Moreover, cointegration implies the idea of a long-run relationship between the variables under 
scrutiny, which is clearly inappropriate in our case. Expectations are indeed influenced by short-run variations in 
the proxies for π.   15 
(β1>0 is expected)
8. We also consider the size of the regional population POP, to capture scale 
effects in redistribution of resources, which may determine lower per capita transfers (β2<0). 
Finally, we include regional fixed effects ai, aimed at capturing historical differences in the 
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Table 1 reports the results, for total transfers (model 1), current transfers (model 2) and 
capital  transfers  (model  3),  respectively.  In  model  1,  the  estimated  coefficient  for  lagged 
unemployment is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, remains positive and 
loses over-dispersion when correlated with transfers earmarked for current spending (model 2) 
and turns to negative while remaining significant at the 1% level when transfers earmarked for 
capital spending are examined (model 3). This pattern of results is quite plausible, as current 
transfers  finance  spending  in  social  security  programs,  the  most  sensitive  to  employment 
conditions, which are administered by regional governments  and mandated by the central 
government.  Capital  transfers,  to  finance  infrastructures  and  similar  projects,  are  instead 
concentrated  in  more  developed  regions  where  unemployment  is  lower.  The  negative 
coefficient β2 on the size of the population reflect economies of scale in the distribution of the 
transfers, which again are concentrated in current transfers and absent in capital transfers. The 
diagnostics reveal a high precision of the estimates, but a rather low explanatory power, with 
an  adjusted  R
2  ranging  from  0.38  in  model  1  to  0.54  in  model  3.  Clearly,  the  variables 
included in the formula can explain only a part of the distribution of grants; what is left, 
between 2/3 and one half of total grants, is distributed according to different criteria.  
To uncover them, the next step is augmenting equation (1) with the proxies for changes in 
expectations.  To  verify  the  stability  of  the  coefficients  only  the  time-varying  proxies  are 
introduced first, then the region-varying ones are considered as well. 
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8 Alternative indicators that have been considered are the difference between region i’s per capita output 
growth and the national average (DGGDP) and the region’s output per capita (GDP/POP). As it is often found in 
this sample (Padovano, 2011), the unemployment rate carries the greatest explanatory variable among these 
indicators of fiscal capacity; only the results with this variable are therefore reported. The estimates with the 
DGGDP and GDP/POP covariates are available upon request.   16 
Table 2 reports the results. The TREND variable reveals the importance of the historical 
expenditure rule in setting the level of transfers allotted to the regions. It must be stressed the 
“historical  expenditure”  is  a  general  criterion  related  to  current  expenditures  (capital 
expenditures  are  financed  according  to  different  criteria)  that  was  embedded  (until  quite 
recently) in all the yearly financial bills of the general government; as such it should affect the 
funds distributed to all regions in the same way. The estimates do reflect this institutional 
arrangement, as the coefficient on TREND is statistically significant only in funds for current 
expenditures (model 5), not in those for capital expenditures (model 6). The stringency of the 
budget constraint is captured by the DDPIL variable, and the positive estimated coefficient 
reveals  that  when  the  Italian  deficit  was  large  relative  to  the  EU15  average,  transfers  to 
regions  –  effectively,  a  central  government  outlay  –  increase,  with  the  one  year  lag  that 
separates  the  moments  when  resources  are  appropriated  and  spent.  The  coefficient  is, 
however, barely  significant,  probably due to  the contrasting relationship  between the two 
types  of  grants  (positive  and borderline to  significant  for  the quantitatively  larger current 
transfers,  negative  for  the  quantitatively  smaller  capital  ones),  which  again  reflects  the 
different time pattern of these expenditures. The political time varying proxies are generally 
consistent with the hypotheses. Stronger central governments, denoted by larger parliamentary 
majorities (variable NDIF) are less needful to buy votes by distributing grants to regional 
constituencies,  especially  those  earmarked  to  current  expenditures  of  redistributive  nature 
(model 5). These governments, on the other hand, feel more confident about their re-election 
and are more prone to distribute funds for long-run projects like capital spending, as shown by 
the positive estimated coefficient on TRK (model 6). The same pattern of results is found for 
government cohesion, HM; in both cases, the estimated coefficients are always significant at 
the 1% level
9. Finally, transfers to regions appear sensitive to the timing of national elections, 
as they increase in the pre-electoral year and are contracted in the year after – albeit not to the 
same extent. Contrary to what predicted in signalling models à la Rogoff (1990), no evidence 
of a cycle is found in capital transfers, whose dynamics seems quite steady (model 6). The 
variables  already  considered  in  equation  (1)  generally  retain  their  signs  and  significance 
levels; the overall precision of the estimates are quite high (F statistics significant at the 1% 
                                                 
9 Two other variables have been tried to test the same war of attritions hypothesis: the number of days in 
which each government was in charge (GOVDUR) and the overall duration of consecutive governments with the 
same Prime Minister (PRIMIN), to focus on effective government changes. The results, available upon request, 
are basically the same as with the HM variable. We report those on the index of concentration of the government 
majority because it is an ex ante measure of government duration, thus more in line with the war of attrition 
theory (Padovano and Venturi, 2001).     17 
level), while the explanatory power of the estimates are higher than in equation 1, ranging 
from 58% in model 5 to 78% in model 6. 
We then proceed to the estimate of equation (3), which includes also the region-specific 
proxies of the vector RPROXY. The results are reported in Table 3. A widely held view is 
that, because in Italy transfers to subcentral governments are dictated by a formula (Brosio et 
al.,  2007),  expectations  concerning  them  should  not  be  sensitive  to  anything  that  is  not 
included in it (Bordignon and Turati, 2009), especially lobbying activities. We challenge that 
view in view of the results of a previous paper (Padovano, 2011) and verify whether the years 
in power of the regional governor – variable GOVYEARS, a proxy for lobbying efficiency in 
the spirit of Olson’s (1982) theories on lobbies’ penetration – affect the region’s ability to 
obtain funds. The simultaneous consideration of the linear trend ensures that the variable 
GOVYEARS is not capturing incremental processes like the historical expenditure rule. The 
positive and statistically significant coefficients in models 7 and 8 reveal that there is more in 
the distribution of transfers than just the formula and that lobbying is particularly important in 
the domain of current grants. The estimated coefficient on GOVYEARS in the regression for 
capital grants has also a positive sign but is not significant, possibly because of the longer 
time lags of these types of financing instruments (model 9). There is no sign that regional 
elections affect the distribution of transfers, possibly because they are often held in the same 
year as the national elections. Once the ELN variable is removed from the right hand side of 
the equation, ELR picks up some significance.  The vote margin between the party of the 
governor and the largest one of the opposing coalition (covariate RDIF) confirms, however, 
that regional electoral politics does play a role in the distribution of grants. This estimated 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in a linear specification, whilst its squared 
value, when added in, is never significant. This pattern of results supports the prediction of the 
“core supporters” model of Cox and McCubbins (1986) over the “swing voters” model of 
Dixit and Londregan (1996). This result confirms in the electoral domain what has been found 
for lobbying, namely that strength and endurance at the local level is what matters to obtain 
funds from the central government. As in the majority of the political regressors, this effect is 
detected  only  for  total  and  current  transfers,  as  theory  itself  suggests  (models  7  and  8). 
Finally, we fail to find evidence of an alignment effect (Arhulampalan et al., 2009), although 
the covariate SAME comes close to borderline significant in model 8 for current transfers. 
This lack of significance may be due to multicollinearity with the regional fixed effects, or 
with other variables explicitly included in the model. Another possible explanation is that, 
insofar as SAME approximates phenomena such as party cohesiveness or trust in politics,   18 
these seem to be low in the strategic interactions under inquiry. As for the regressors already 
included in equations (1) and (2), they retain their signs and significant levels, with the only 
exception of the rate of unemployment, which now appears to be positively and significantly 
correlated only with funds for current expenditures, as their nature suggests.  
Equation (4) augments equation (3) with the proxy FBOUT, to test Pettersson-Lidbom’s 
(2008)  and  Pettersson-Lidbom  and  Dahlberg’s  (2003)  hypothesis  that  the  history  of  past 
bailing out should be the best predictor for expectations of future formal bailing out. The 
results are reported in Table 4. 
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The negative and significant coefficient on lagged FBOUT, illustrated in Table 4, seem to 
suggest that previous  episodes  of bailing  out  make it harder for regional  governments  to 
receive funds in later periods. The overall estimates are  unsatisfactory, however, because the 
frequency and pervasiveness of formal bailing out episodes in our sample make the FBOUT 
regressor almost a scale matrix, with very few 0 values. The FBOUT regressor thus actually 
captures the decreasing trend that transfers to regions have followed in the sample period. For 
this variable to be meaningful it would have to report the financial amount of the bailing out; 
yet this information is generally impossible to gauge  from the text of the financial bill, as in 
many cases it is dispersed across administrative decrees to which the financial bill refers. Only 
the measure of transfers, the dependent variable, includes, but does not single out, the size of 
the formal bailing out. 
5.2.  Expenditure.  The  next  phase  of  the  analysis  is  the  examination  of  regional 
expenditures.  The  analysis  can  be  divided  in  two  steps:  the  first  considers  “structural” 
variables, which previous theoretical and empirical studies reckon as important determinants 
of expenditures. As explained in the empirical strategy, the goal of this first step is to obtain a 
specification of the baseline behavioural equations of regional governments as complete and 
precise  as  possible,  short  of  expectations  about  the  central  government’s  toughness.  The 
second step verifies the empirical restriction H2, by considering the role of funding and of 
bailout expectations in the spending decisions of the regional governments. The selection of 
the  explanatory  variables  takes  into  account  that  about  between  35%  to  55%  of  total 
expenditures  of  Italian  regions  are  related  with  the  provision  of  health  care  services,  as 
explained in appendix B.   19 
Beginning with the structural variables, and taking into account the result of the previous 
literature (Mueller, 2003; Bordignon and Turati, 2009), we consider five possible types of 
effects on expenditures: (a) a “demand effect”, proxied by the proportion of the population 
over age 65 and below age 16 (POP65 and POP15), i.e., the cohorts of the population – 
especially the first - who might be high demanders of health care; (b) a “demand induction 
effect”, determined by the number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants (PHYS) and the number 
of top regional bureaucrats (directors of the public administration of class 5 and 6, according 
to the classification of the Ministry of the Interior) normalized by the size population, to 
account for expansionary effects of the budget à la Niskanen (variable NBUR); (c) a “supply 
effect”, measured by the average number of beds per hospital (AVBEDS), which essentially 
serves as a proxy for the economies of scale in the provision of health care services; (d) an 
“income  effect”,  indicated  by  GDP  per  capita  (GDP/POP),  to  control  for  phenomena 
associated with the so-called Wagner’s law; (e) a “partisan effect”, to reflect the assumed 
greater parsimony in government spending of right wing regional governments over left wing 
ones (dummy variable RIGHT). Hence, the general equation to be estimated is: 
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where the vector POPx includes the two potential high demanders of regional spending, ε5 
is a disturbance term, and a and δ are regional fixed effects and year effects, respectively. As 
in the case of the funding equations, regional expenditures Eit are first examined in their (real 
per capita) total value, then are disaggregated between current and capital expenditures. The 
results are reported in Table 5. Among the demand effect indicators, the estimated coefficients 
on the POP65 covariate are consistently positive and significant at the 1% level and slightly 
larger in the case of current expenditures (model 14) than of capital ones (model 15). The 
elderly appear in fact the only high demanders of regional expenditures, chiefly health care; 
the younger cohort of population POP15 never carries any significant explanatory power and 
was therefore excluded from the reported estimates. Demand induced effects are also found, 
as  more doctors and regional administrators are positively  correlated  with  the size of the 
regional  budget.  The  covariate  PHYS  indicates  that  this  effect  is  stronger  in  current 
expenditures (that includes the salaries of health care employees) than in the case of capital 
spending
10. The number of top bureaucrats is positively correlated with  aggregate spending 
                                                 
10  Another  specification  that  has  been  tried  included  the  doctors  working  in  public  hospitals  only 
(PUBPHYS). The results are somewhat less significant, possibly because in Italy hospital doctors are allowed to   20 
but only at the 10% level, and loses significance (still retaining a positive sign) when the two 
components of spending are examined separately. This is most likely due to the low frequency 
of this indicator: the Minister of Interior censed the administrators only three times, in 1990, 
1995 and 2001. The number of hospital beds per capita has generally a positive sign (in total 
and  in  capital  spending,  while  the  coefficient  on  current  spending  is  borderline  not 
significant), indicating that economies of scale are not being exploited. This inefficiency is 
consistent with the presence of demand induced effects in regional spending: the two results 
reinforce the plausibility of each.  The regressor capturing income per capita confirms the 
presence of Wagner’s Law type effects, but not in capital expenditures (model 15). This result 
is consistent with the literature on the growth of government (Mueller, 2003), but may also be 
due to the Italian policy of mandating public investment projects in the Mezzogiorno regions, 
where  income  per  capita  is  lower  and  grows  less  rapidly.  Finally,  the  covariate  on  the 
ideology  of  regional  governments  reveals  no  significant  correlation  with  any  type  of 
government  spending
11.  The diagnostics reveal a high precision of the estimates (the  F 
statistics are significant at the 1% level in all models); even more importantly, given our goal 
to have a specification of the behavioural equation as complete and as precise as possible, the 
adjusted R
2 climbs to values between 0.83 and 0.97.  
5.3. Expectations. The specification of equation (5) may be spurious, however, as it does 
not account for expectations. Only the year fixed effects act as a loose proxy for the shift in 
expectations.  To  test  if  bailing  out  expectations  are  the  missing  determinants  of  the 
expenditure  equation  a  different  expenditure  equation  must  be  estimated.  The  theoretical 
claim H2 is that – after having observed a low level of funding – regions should react with a 
low level of expenditure the higher is π, the expectation that the central government be of the 
tough  type.  To  investigate  this  hypothesis,  equation  (5)  is  augmented  by  considering  the 
explained  component  of  transfers  F ˆ   from  equation  (3),  the  best  fitting  one  in  terms  of 
information criteria. Notice that  F ˆ  can be thought of as representing the “expected” financing 
by  regions  given  changes  in  π,  and  this  provides  us  with  the  test  of  the  H2  theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                         
exercise also in the private sector - and the majority of them actually do so (Turati, 2008). The variable PHYS, 
private  doctors,  seems  therefore  the  most  appropriate  to  capture  demand  induced  effects  in  health  care 
expenditures. 
11  When regional politics is  examined in greater detail , for instance by distinguishing between ordinary 
statute and special statute regions   and between national and regional party lists,   some evidence of greater 
parsimony of right wing governments emerges (Padovano, 2011).    21 
prediction: when π is larger, conditional on expected funding, regions should be more likely to 
react with a low level of expenditure
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where the vector  X includes all the covariates of equation (5) and ε6 is the disturbance 
term. Table 6 reports the results. The data lend empirical support to the empirical restriction 
H2, viz., that regions tend to react with a low level of expenditure the higher is the expectation 
that the central government be tough. The estimated coefficient on the  F ˆ , lagged one period 
to  account  for  the  one  year  delay  between  appropriation  and  spending,  is  positive  and 
significant at the 5% level, in the model with total and capital spending (models 16 and 18). 
The  estimated  coefficient  on  current  expenditures  has  the  expected  sign  but  it  is  not 
statistically  significant,  possibly  because  of  the  higher  variability  of  this  component  of 
government spending, inherently more difficult to predict. The lack of significance of the 
simultaneous  F ˆ  value corroborates the impression that the autoregressive forecasting method 
reflects  the  institutional  features  of  the  financial  relationships  between  the  Italian  central 
government  and  the  regions,  thus  reinforcing  the  plausibility of  the  analysis.  The  other 
covariates of vector X keep their sign and, by and large, levels of statistical significance. 
Quite importantly, in these estimates that include the contemporaneous and lagged fitted value 
of transfers  F ˆ  there is still no sign of serial correlation. The null hypothesis of zero value 
coefficient is rejected at the 1% level, the adjusted R
2 are between 0.96 and 0.98. 
To check the robustness of this result, we have resorted to a second estimation strategy, 
based on a IV methodology. This also allows to take into account the critique, raised by 
Pettersson-Lidblom  and  Dahlberg  (2003),  that  an  incorrect  specification  of  the  funding 
equation  translate  into  an  incorrect  specification  of  the  casual  relationship  between 
expenditures and financing; if, instead, an alternative estimation technique, in the present case 
2SLS-IV,  confirms  the  results  obtained  with  the  autoregressive  model,  such  concerns  are 
dissipated.  As  it  is  standard  practice  in  this  literature  (Pettersson-Lidblom  and  Dahlberg, 
2003), we use our time varying and regional specific proxies for expectations and their lagged 
values  as  the  instruments  for  the  2SLS  estimates  of  Equation  (7),  reported  in  table  7. 
Reassuringly, the estimates of the  F ˆ  coefficient are very similar to those obtained with the 
autoregressive  model,  if  anything,  the  estimates  of  the expectations  proxies become more 
                                                 
12 This approach is close to Rodden (2005) that examines the impact of “expected” and “unexpected” 
revenues from the federal government on the regional expenditure in Germany, using an autoregressive 
forecasting model to estimate yearly expected values for revenues.   22 
precise. Again only lagged expected transfers affect current spending, consistent with the one 
year delay with which this funds are cashed in; this time, however, expected transfers are 
significantly correlated, and with the expected positive sign, with all types of expenditures, 
also the more erratic current spending programs. The correlation with the other covariates 
remain basically unchanged. These results further confirm the correctness and completeness 
of the specification of the funding equation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The present  analysis  shows that  bailing out  expectations play an important  role in  the 
determination of different types of spending of regional governments in Italy. Formulas, even 
when enshrined in a law and introduced as a part of a policy to stabilize the public finances, 
such  as  the  one  followed  by  the  Italian  central  governments  under  the  discipline  of  the 
Stability  Pact,  can  explain  only  a  part  of  the  distribution  of  transfers  to  the  regional 
governments. Transfers appear in fact to be influenced by variables that capture changes in 
bailing  out  expectations;  the  proxies  for  these  expectations  that  the  political  economy 
literature suggests have indeed a relevant explanatory power, sometimes equal, and in many 
cases greater, that that of the formula variables. Furthermore, the analysis shows that bailing 
out  expectations  have  behavioural  consequences,  as  they  turn  out  to  be  an  important 
determinant of regional spending.  
Our results  confirm  that multi-centred models  of strategic interactions  among different 
government  levels  based  on  games  with  incomplete  information  à  la  Harsanyi  (1967-68) 
provide a satisfactory theoretical base to explain the distribution of grants from central to 
subcentral governments. In particular, the data support the theory even when the whole of 
central government transfers and regional expenditures are considered, and not only a specific 
spending program as in Bordignon and Turati (2009). Given the longer time series, the larger 
set of regions and the greater array of proxies for bailing out expectations that have been 
considered in the present empirical analysis compared to that of Bordignon and Turati (2009) 
the  underlying  theory  appears  to  have  a  fairly  general  explanatory  power.  More  tests  on 
datasets drawn from other countries are the logical next step ahead.  
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line Table 1. Estimates of Equation 1 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Dependent 
variable 




























Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimator  EGLS  EGLS  EGLS 
Adj. R
2  0.53  0.38  0.54 
S.E.R.  0.000242  0.000239  7.6-05 




D.W.  1.9  1.86  2.19 
Sample period  1998-2007  1998-2007  1998-2007 
N.  210  210  210 
 
Note : t-statstics in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2. Estimates of Equation 2 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Dependent 
variable 
TR/POP  TCC/POP  TCK/POP 

























































































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimator  EGLS  EGLS  EGLS 
Adj. R
2  0.63  0.58  0.78 
S.E.R.  0.0002  0.00023  6.83
-05 




D.W.  1.98  1.98  2.04 
Sample period  1998-2006  1998-2006  1998-2006 
N.  189  189  189 
 
Note : t-statstics in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3. Estimates of Equation 3  
  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
Dependent 
variable 
TR/POP  TCC/POP  TCK/POP 






























































































































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimator  EGLS  EGLS  EGLS 
Adj. R
2  0.63  0.57  0.78 
S.E.R.  0.0002  0.0002  6.78
-05 




D.W.  2.03  2.03  2.03 
Sample period  1998-2006  1998-2006  1998-2006 
N.  189  189  189 
 
Note : t-statstics in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Estimates of Equation 4 
  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
Dependent 
variable 
TR/POP  TCC/POP  TCK/POP 




































































































































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimator  EGLS  EGLS  EGLS 
Adj. R
2  0.6  0.56  0.78 
S.E.R.  0.0002  0.0002  6.8
-05 




D.W.  2.12  2.13  2.03 
Sample period  1998-2007  1998-2006  1998-2006 
N.  189  189  189 
 
Note : t-statstics in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Estimates of Equation 5  
  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15 
Dependent 
variable 





























































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimator  EGLS  EGLS  EGLS 
Adj. R
2  0.94  0.93  0.83 
S.E.R.  0.0007  0.0006  0.0002 




D.W.  1.76  1.72  1.87 
Sample period  1997-2007  1997-2007  1997-2007 
N.  231  231  231 
 
Note : t-statstics in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
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Table 6. Estimates of Equation 6 – autoregressive model 
  Model 16  Model 17  Model 18 
Dependent 
variable 








































































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimator  EGLS  EGLS  EGLS 
Adj. R
2  0.97  0.98  0.96 
S.E.R.  0.0006  0.0003  0.0002 




D.W.  2.17  2.16  2.02 
Sample period  2000-2007  2000-2007  2000-2007 
N.  147  147  147 
 
Note : t-statstics in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Estimates of Equation 6 – IV model 
  Model 19  Model 20  Model 21 
Dependent 
variable 




































































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 







2  0.96  0.98  0.89 
S.E.R.  0.0004  0.0009  182.09 




D.W.  2.16  2.18  2.25 
Sample period  2000-2007  2000-2007  2000-2007 
N.  147  147  147 
 
Note : t-statstics in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Instruments  used:  DDEFt, DDEF  t-1, TREND, NDIFt, HMt, ELNt, YEARSt, ELRt, RDIFt, 
SAMEt Table 8. Financing and expenditures of government levels, year 2001 (percentages of total expenditures). 
  Taxe
s 
Social security  
contributions 




















10,7  10,2 










2,0  0,0 










4,9  0,8 










4,9  0,8 












33,5  1,6 












18,6  -0,2 
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11,5  6,6 
Source: Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (2001), Vol. III, Appendix SP1.   37 







































2  168  12,4  22,4 
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37855 





9  184  12,5  22,7 
110659 





9  155  12,1  23,2 
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130012 





2  119  13,4  21,3 
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84597 





7  209  15,7  17,3 
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1  195  16,2  18 
73475 





2  68  12,9  17,6 
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75  192  14,1  19,7 
1259437 
21,8  11,1  57,5 Figure 5. Regional distribution of per family income, 1995-2000 averages, 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
Source: Cannari and D’Alessio, (2003). 
 
Figure 6. Fiscal autonomy of the Regions 
 
Source: Ambosianio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008). 
 Appendix A. Proof of the model 
The proof is limited to the case of  incomplete information, since the case of common 
knowledge is already demonstrated in section 2. Under incomplete information, the cases of 
the tough central government and of the weak one that prefers bailing out later to giving in 
immediately (U
CbW(R, E)>U
CW(R,E)) can be summarized in  
 
PROPOSITION  1  Suppose  it  is  common  knowledge  that  U
CbW(R,E)>U
CW(R,E). 
Then, there is a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies of the game. In 
this  equilibrium,  both  types  of  government  set  r  in  the  first  period,  the  local 
government’s  posterior  beliefs  coincide  with  its  a  priori  beliefs,  and  the  local 







In  the  case  where  it  prefers  giving  in  immediately  (U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E)),  the  weak 
government can try to take advantage of regional government’s uncertainty and mimic the 
“tough” type. Formally, let us then define a separating equilibrium in pure strategies as one 
where each central government type plays in the first period a different optimal strategy; and a 
pooling equilibrium as an equilibrium where both central government types play the same 
strategy in the first period. We begin by establishing the following: 
 
LEMMA 1 Suppose it is commonly known that U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E). Then, there is 
no separating equilibrium in pure strategies in the game. 
 
In a separating equilibrium, the weak government plays R and the tough type plays r at M2. 
Given  these  equilibrium  strategies,  the  regional  government  concludes  that  if  the  central 
government plays R is of the weak type and reacts by setting E at M3, while if the government 
plays r is of the tough type, and reacts by setting e. But the latter cannot be equilibrium. Given 
these posterior beliefs of the regional government, at the stage of considering the optimal 
strategies for the two types, the weak government would always be better off by playing r at 
M2 and having the regional government answer with e at M3, since U
CW(r,e)>U
CW(R,E). This 
is an optimal deviation for the weak type, which breaks the separating equilibrium. In this 
kind  of  game  the  weak  government  always  finds  it  convenient  to  mimic  the  tough 
government.  To  see  when  this  pooling  behaviour  can  be  supported  in  equilibrium,  the 
following assumption about the regional government’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs with respect 
to the pooling equilibrium strategies must be introduced. Since the tough type will never play 
R at M2 out of dominance, while the weak type could play R under some solutions of the 
game, we assume that if the regional government observes R at M2, it rationally concludes 
that this move can only come from a weak government. This assumption made, one can state 
the following: 
 
LEMMA 2 Suppose it is commonly known that U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E). Then, under 
the  above  assumption  about  the  out-of-equilibrium  beliefs,  for  π≥  π’  there  exists  a 
unique  pooling  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies.  At  this  equilibrium,  both  types  of 
government choose r at M2, and the regional government optimally selects e at M3. 
 
At the pooling equilibrium strategies for the two types, both types of central government 
play r at M2. Hence, the posterior belief of the regional government equals the a priori and, 
for  π≥π’,  the  optimal  reaction  of  the  regional  government  is  to  set  e  at  M3.  This  is  an 
equilibrium;  the  tough  government  always  plays  r  by  dominance,  and  under  the  out-of-
equilibrium beliefs assumption, if the weak central government deviates and sets R at M2, the   41 
regional government selects E at M3, and this outcome is worse for the weak government than 
the equilibrium outcome, because in case B) U
CW(r,e)>U
CbW(R,E) still holds. Hence, if π is 
sufficiently high, the weak government can successfully imitate the tough government. This 
proves the lemma. 
When π<π’, the pooling equilibrium in pure strategies of lemma 2 cannot be sustained. The 
regional government would expect the choice of r to come from a weak government with 
higher probability and would then rationally react by choosing E at M3. Expecting this, the 
weak  government  would  then  be  better  off  by  choosing  R  immediately,  because 
U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E). Neither could the resulting separating equilibrium in pure strategies be 
sustainable, as lemma 1 proves, since at the separating posterior equilibrium beliefs the weak 
government would always be better off by mimicking the tough type. The solution is then to 
look  for  mixed  strategies  equilibria,  where  the  weak  government  plays  r  with  some 
equilibrium probability and the regional government reacts by selecting e with some other 
equilibrium probability. The next lemma describe this equilibrium. 
 
LEMMA 3  Suppose  that it is  commonly known that  U
CW(R,E)>U
CbW(R,E).  Then, 
under  our  assumption  above  on  out-of-equilibrium  beliefs,  for  π<π’  there  exists  a 
unique pooling equilibrium in mixed strategies. At this equilibrium, at M2 the tough 
government always chooses r, and the weak government chooses r with probability ρ
* 
and  R  with  probability  1-ρ
*.  The  regional  government,  upon  observing  R,  always 
chooses E, and upon observing r selects e in the second period with probability ζ
* and E 
with probability 1-ζ
*. The equilibrium beliefs of the regional government are such that, 
upon observing R, it assigns zero probability to the central government being of the 
tough  type,  and  upon  observing  r  it  assigns  probability  π
°(ρ
*)≡π/[π+(1-π)ρ
*]  to  the 














Suppose  the  regional  government  expects  the  weak  government  to  play  r  at  M2  with 
probability  ρ. The tough government  always  plays  r by dominance.  By  Bayes  rule, upon 




*], the government is tough. The regional government will then be indifferent between 









*) and then solving for ρ, this gives ρ
*. In turn, for the weak government to be willing 
to  randomise  between  playing  r  and  R  in  the  first  period,  it  must  also  be  indifferent  in 
expected  terms  between  the  two  strategies.  This  occurs  if  the  regional  government,  upon 
observing r in the first period, plays e with probability ζ
*, where ζ






CW(r,e).  Note  that  the  proposed  strategies  and 
beliefs indeed constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. By construction, no other strategies 
would make any agent better off, given the strategies played by the other agents, and the 
beliefs  of  regional  government  are  derived  by  using  Bayes  rule,  given  the  equilibrium 
strategies of the two types of government. Finally, this equilibrium is also unique, as we have 
shown that, for π<π’, there is neither a separating nor a pooling equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Finally, combining Lemma 1, 2 and 3, we get the following Proposition 2. 
 




1) for π≥π’ there exists a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies, 
where both the tough and the weak type of government choose r at M2, the regional   42 
government’s  posterior  beliefs  coincide  with  a  priori  beliefs,  and  the  regional 
government optimally responds with e at M3; 
2) for π<π’ there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. At 
this  equilibrium,  at  M2  the  tough  government  always  chooses  r,  and  the  weak 
government chooses r with probability ρ
*, and R with probability 1-ρ
*. The regional 
government, upon observing R chooses E and upon observing r selects e at M3 with 
probability  ζ
*  and  E  with  probability  1-ζ
*.  The  equilibrium  beliefs  of  the  regional 
government  are  such  that,  upon  observing  R,  it  assigns  zero  probability  to  the 



















Appendix B. The Italian institutional framework  
The  vertical  organization  of  the  Italian  public  sector  features  three  main  tiers  of 
government: central, regional (which includes the regions and the local health units, the so 
called ASL, Aziende Sanitarie Locali), and local (including provinces and municipalities), 
plus the nationwide social security system (pensions and unemployment insurance). There are 
15 ordinary statute regions (Regioni a Statuto Ordinario, RSO), five special statute regions 
(Regioni a Statuto Speciale, RSS), 109 provinces, and more than 8100 municipalities ranging 
in size from some 30 inhabitants (Morterone in Lombardy) to more than 2,5 million (Rome). 
The most important “horizontal” institutional difference is between the RSO and the RSS. 
Geographical,  cultural,  and  economic  lead  to  the  establishment,  recognized  at  the 
Constitutional level, of five autonomous regions (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige and 
Friuli Venezia Giulia in the North; Sicily and Sardinia in the South) with special statutes. 
They have broader spending powers than the ordinary statute regions and correspondingly 
larger financial transfers from the central government (Brosio et al., 2007). The RSO, though 
foreseen by the Constitution, were implemented only in 1970.  
Table 9 reports the composition of the financing of public expenditure (gross of transfers) 
by  the  various  fiscal  instruments  (taxes,  social  security  contributions,  transfers,  other 
revenues,  deficit)  for  each  level  of  government.  Even  after  the  massive  decentralization 
process of the 1990s (Arachi and Zanardi, 2004), grants from other levels of government still 
provide a very substantial share of total revenues of sub-national governments and social 
security institutions.  
The organization and size of the Italian public sector find an important motivation in the 
stark  and  persistent  structural  and  economic  disparities  between  the  regions  that  have 
characterized the country since its unification in 1861. The traditional strong centralization of 
the  Italian  public  finances  is  grounded  in  the  idea  that  the  central  government  is  better 
positioned to direct the fluxes of redistribution needed to reduce the differences in levels of 
economic development among the regions (Brosio et. al. 2007).  Table 9 present some of the 
main features of these regional disparities as they are today. The Italian regions differ widely 
in surface area (a relevant feature for economies of scale in public production), in population 
density and age structure: the population is substantially younger in the South than in the 
North,  with  obvious  impacts  on  healthcare  and  pension  expenditures.  Moving  from  the 
northern to the southern regions, the probability for an individual of being poor increases four 
times and per-capita GDP is cut in half, with the inevitable impact on fiscal capacity. Recent 
analyses by the Bank of Italy confirm this result for average family income and wealth for the 
1995-2000 time interval (Cannari and D’Alessio, 2003; Figure 5). This geographical dualism 
explains the particular emphasis on inter-regional redistribution in the Italian political debate.    43 
The regions have the main responsibility of health care provision, plus some spending 
programs related with education, transport, social assistance and culture. In quantitative terms, 
health care expenditures represent more than 50% of all regional outlays in RSOs and almost 
40% in RSSs, making for a national average around 50% (Turati, 2003). While health care 
provisions are decided at the regional level, funding is mandated by the central government. 
The Italian National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN) was instituted in 
1979 and, until 1998, expenditures were decided by the regional government and deficits were 
covered  through  grants  by  the  central  government,  with  the  predictable  problems  of  soft 
budget  constraints.  Following  the  political  and  economic  turmoil  of  the  beginning  of  the 
1990s, a number of reforms were implemented to harden the local budget constraints and 
improve accountability and responsibility of local governments. Regions in particular moved 
from being financed by tax revenue for only about 15% in 1990 to over 50% of their budget, 
as Figure 6 shows. Of course, these numbers have to be taken with care, as they mix up own 
taxes (where local governments can at least vary the rates) with local shares of central taxes 
(where autonomy is none). But the main jump in Figure 6 does coincide with the introduction 
of  a  major  tax  on  value  added  (net  of  depreciations)  raised  at  the  firm  level,  the  IRAP 
(Imposta  Regionale  sulle  Attività  Produttive)  entrusted  to  the  regions  and,  until  2001, 
earmarked  to  finance  health  expenditures  (since  then  regions  can  freely  dispose  of  the 
revenues). The central government has also tried to progressively substitute transfers to the 
RSOs with a participation to the revenues from the value added tax (IVA, Imposta sul Valore 
Aggiunto), a process that should be completed in 2013. Both measures may be interpreted as 
an increase of the tax autonomy of the regional governments; yet it is always the central 
government that regulates the tax bases, the tax rates and the special provisions of the fiscal 
instruments attributed to the regions. Finally, since the year 2000 the distribution of grants to 
RSOs was explicitly restricted to purposes of income equalization, according to a specific 
formula that takes into consideration each region’s per capita fiscal capacity and health care 
spending  needs  relative  to  the  national  average  (Brosio  et  al.,  2007).  Although  the 
implementation of this stricter regime is phased out in 13 years, already in 2002 and 2005 the 
central government was forced to accept derogations to the transfers foreseen by the formula. 
 
Appedix C. Data sources 
ISTAT and the Ministry of Economic Development started to collect financial data about 
the decentralized government levels (except municipalities) since 1996; consistent data about 
the financial and economic relationships between the central government and the regions are 
thus available from 1996 to 2007. Economic and financial data, specifically those for the 
variables TR, TCC, TCK, EXP, EXPCC and EXPCK, are from Ragioneria Generale dello 
Stato, Ministero dell’Economia e Finanze, www.rgs.mef.gov.it/. Data about formal bailing 
out operations (BOUT) are collected from the financial bills (Legge Finanziairia) of the years 
1999-2007, especially laws 129/2001, 312/2004 and DL 23/2007. DDEF is from Eurostat. 
Political variables, precisely ELN, ELR, NDIF, RDIF, SAME, RIGHT and YEAR are from 
Ministero dell’Interno. Finally, sociodemographic and health care variables are from ISTAT, 
respectively from  www.demo.istat.it, (POP, POP15, POP65)  www.istat.it/conti/territoriali/ 
(GDP, U, RPIL) and www.istat.it/sanita/Health/ (AVGBED, PHYS, PUBPHYS). 